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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHERIFF OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - ^ _ _ _ CASE NO. U-22837 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
CERTILMAN BALIN ADLER & HYMAN, LLP (Wayne Schaefer and Scott B. 
Black of counsel), for Charging Party 
CULLEN & DYKMAN, LLP (Thomas B. Wassell of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (County) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the County violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
discontinued the assignment of County vehicles to two employees in the bargaining unit 
represented by the Sheriff Officers Association, Inc. (Association), the charging party 
herein. 
The ALJ found that there was an established past practice of the County assigning 
County-owned vehicles for use on a twenty-four hours, seven days a week basis, to the 
commanding officer of its training academy and the commanding officer of its data 
processing unit. The Sheriff of Nassau County (Sheriff) decided to reduce the number of 
County vehicles assigned to Sheriff's Department employees and unilaterally 
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discontinued this practice on May 7, 2001. The instant charge was then filed on 
September 7, 2001. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County excepts to the ALJ's finding that there is an established past practice 
of these employees being assigned County-owned cars and that the assignment was not 
conditioned on job duties, which the County argues, are no longer performed by these 
two commanding officers. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only as 
relevant to our determination. 
Paul Mumford was assigned as commander of the data processing unit in July 
2000. His predecessor had been assigned a County vehicle on a "round the clock" basis 
from the time of his appointment until he was replaced by Mumford. Mumford was 
assigned a County vehicle on the same basis upon his appointment to the command 
position. 
James Michaud was named the commander of the training academy in July 2000. 
He was, at that time, assigned a County vehicle for his own use in performing his job and 
traveling to and from home. Since 1990, all the commanders of the training unit have 
been assigned a County vehicle. 
Edward Reilly, appointed Sheriff in 2000, instituted a policy shortly thereafter to 
reduce the personal use of County vehicles by employees of the Sheriff's Department. On 
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May 7, 2001, both Mumford and Michaud were informed that they were no longer 
permitted personal use of County vehicles. Reilly issued a written policy to that effect on 
August 6, 2001. 
DISCUSSION 
The employee "benefit of County-owned vehicles, which were available on a 24-
hour basis for use in connection with their employment as well as for driving to and from 
work . . . "1 is a term and condition of employment for employees, the unilateral 
elimination of which constitutes a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Historically, the 
commanders of the training academy and the data processing unit have enjoyed the use 
of a County vehicle on a twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week basis. The record 
establishes that the practice of assigning vehicles to the incumbents of these positions 
has been in existence for over ten years on a continuous and uninterrupted basis. There 
is no record evidence that the assignment of the vehicles was contingent upon the rank of 
the employee holding the commander position, nor is there any evidence that specific 
duties assigned to either of the commander titles were a condition precedent to the 
personal use of a County vehicle. Nor has it been established that the duties of the 
commander of the training academy or the commander of the data processing unit have 
changed significantly since Mumford and Michaud were appointed. Indeed, both 
employees enjoyed the unlimited use of a County-owned vehicle for almost a year after 
their respective appointments. 
1
 County of Nassau, 13 PERB 1J3095, at 3152 (1980), aff'g 13 PERB H4570 (1980), 
cont'd, 14 PERB 1J7017 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981), affd., 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB 
1J7012 (2d Dep't. 1982), motion for leave to appeal denied, 57 NY2d 601, 15 PERB fl7015 
(1982). 
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As we noted recently in Bellmore Union Free School District:2 
[a] past practice must be unequivocal and have been in 
existence for a significant period of time such that the 
employees in the unit could reasonably expect the practice to 
continue without change [citation omitted]. A past practice will 
generally be viewed as a practice that affects the unit as a 
whole. 
We there cited to County of Nassau,3 where we held that where a practice involving a 
mandatory subject of negotiations was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a 
period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation 
among the affected unit employees that it would continue, a past practice that could not 
be changed unilaterally was established. 
Here, the ALJ correctly found that the personal use of an employer-provided 
vehicle is a mandatory subject of negotiations and that the County had a long-standing 
practice of providing the incumbents of the two commander positions with a County-
owned vehicle. We find that the County violated the Act when it unilaterally discontinued 
the availability for personal use of County-owned vehicles by the commanders of the 
training academy and the data processing unit. That not every employee in the unit was 
affected by the County's unilateral action does not warrant a contrary conclusion. There 
are practices which affect all employees in a bargaining unit and there are practices that 
are limited to certain titles or circumstances. As we noted in Bellmore, supra, where a 
practice, as relevant to a case before us, is title-specific, it need not affect the unit as a 
2
 34 PERB 1J3009, at 3018 (2001). 
3
 24 PERB 1J3029 (1991). 
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whole for an enforceable past practice to be found. Where the practice pertains to a 
subject of unit-wide concern, it is to be tested on a unit-wide basis.4 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the County violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act 
by unilaterally discontinuing the past practice of assigning County-owned vehicles on a 
twenty-four hours, seven days a week basis to the commanding officers of the training 
academy and the data processing unit. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT the County shall: 
1. Forthwith make James Michaud and Paul Mumford whole, upon a showing of 
reasonable documentary evidence, and/or affidavits, demonstrating that they 
incurred expenses which would not have been incurred but for the elimination 
of the term and condition of employment described in paragraph 2, below, 
together with interest at the maximum legal rate allowed; 
2. Forthwith restore the past practice of assigning vehicles on a twenty-four 
hours, seven days a week basis to the commanding officers of the training 
academy and the data processing unit; 
3. Cease and desist from unilaterally rescinding the past practice of assigning 
vehicles on a twenty-four hours, seven days a week basis to the commanding 
officers of the training academy and the data processing unit. 
4
 See State of New York (Dep't of Corr. Serv. - Groveland Correctional Facility), 35 PERB 
jf3030 (2002), where we found that a practice at one of sixty-two facilities which dealt with 
the use of sick and vacation leave accruals was not an unequivocal unit-wide practice 
that all unit employees could reasonably expect to continue. 
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4. Forthwith sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used 
to communicate with Association bargaining unit members. 
DATED: November 4, 2002 
Albany, New York 
m_ 
ch/aei R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Abb&tf, lUelnber 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
- and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Nassau in the unit represented by the 
Sherifff Officers Association, Inc., that the County of Nassau will: 
1. Forthwith make James Michaud and Paul Mumford whole, upon a showing of reasonable 
documentary evidence, and/or affidavits, demonstrating that they incurred expenses which 
they not have been incurred but for the elimination of the term and condition of employment 
described in paragraph 2, below, together with interest at the maximum legal rate allowed; 
2. Forthwith restore the past practice of assigning vehicles on a twenty-four hours, seven days a 
week basis to the commanding officers of the training academy and the data processing unit; 
and 
3. Not unilaterally rescind the past practice of assigning vehicles on a twenty-four hours, seven 
days a week basis to the commanding officers of the training academy and the data 
processing unit. 
Dated By . 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Nassau 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HOPE SOBIE, 
Gharging-Party^ 
CASE NO. U-21606 
- and -
NEW ROCHELLE FEDERATION OF UNITED 
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 280, AFT/NYSUT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW ROCHELLE, 
Employer. 
MERRIL SOBIE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER (CHRISTOPHER M. CALLAGY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
McGUIRE, KEHL & NEALON, LLP (JEFFREY A. KEHL of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Hope Sobie to an Administrative 
Law Judge's (ALJ) decision dismissing her improper practice charge which, as 
amended, alleged that the New Rochelle Federation of United School Employees, 
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Local 280, AFT/NYSUT, AFL-CIO (FUSE) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused her request to assist her in the 
processing of a grievance against the City School District of the City of New Rochelle 
(District). Sobie alleges that she was eligible for a longevity increase as the result of 
the parties' recently-negotiated collective bargaining agreement. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Sobie excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred on the law and 
the facts. 
The District responded to the exceptions and argued in support of the ALJ's 
dismissal of the charge. FUSE has not responded. Based upon our review of the 
record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the 
ALJ. 
FACTS 
Since this matter is a continuation from a prior decision of this Board remanding 
the matter to the ALJ for further development of the record1 and the subsequent facts 
as adduced by the ALJ,2 we will not repeat the facts except as necessary to our 
decision herein. 
The ALJ found that FUSE and the District entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement for the period July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. In that agreement, Article 
4.03:15 sets forth the terms and conditions for the computation of a "service increment". 
134PERB H3028(2001). 
2
 35 PERB 1J4559 (2002). 
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The parties to the agreement testified through their representatives that the language of 
4.03:15 incorporated the language of Article 2.02:01 (F) of the agreement which 
explained how part-time employees accrue seniority. 
Sobie began her employment with the District in 1967 as a full-time employee. 
In 1972, she resigned her employment with the District. In 1976, she returned to the 
District in a part-time capacity and, in the 1986-1987 school year, she became a full-
time employee. The dispute thus focused on the computation of Sobie's part-time 
employment vis-a-vis her entitlement to a service increment. 
The ALJ found that, prior to the execution of the 1998-2001 successor 
agreement, FUSE notified its members of the agreement's terms. The ALJ further 
found that once Sobie did not receive her alleged longevity increase in September 
1999, she had extensive communications with representatives of FUSE. During these 
conversations, FUSE representatives explained to Sobie why they believed that, under 
the terms of the successor agreement, she was not entitled to a longevity increase. 
Sobie, not satisfied with these explanations, filed a grievance on December 8, 1999. 
On December 17, 1999, the District's superintendent of schools denied Sobie's 
grievance. On December 29, 1999, Sobie requested in writing that FUSE appeal the 
superintendent's denial to arbitration. Thereafter, on January 11, 2000, Sobie met with 
the grievance committee to present her arguments. Sobie was accompanied by her 
husband, an attorney, who was acting as her legal counsel. The grievance committee 
discussed the issues presented by Sobie; however, it decided not to appeal Sobie's 
grievance. Subsequently, the FUSE leadership council unanimously adopted the 
grievance committee's recommendation. 
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DISCUSSION 
The duty of fair representation is breached only by conduct which is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith.3 Allegations that a union has been careless, inept, 
ineffective or negligent in the investigation and presentation of a grievance do not 
evidence a breach of a union's duty of fair representation.4 Sobie argues in her 
exceptions that FUSE is mistaken in its interpretation of the contract language which 
she alleged entitled her to a longevity increase. We have consistently held that a mere 
difference of opinion between an employee organization and an employee about the 
interpretation of a contractual provision or practice is not sufficient to establish a breach 
of the duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act.5 Thus, absent 
evidence of improper motivation on the part of the bargaining agent, its decision not to 
pursue a grievance which is contrary to its interpretation of the contract is not violative 
of its duty of fair representation.6 
Although Sobie alleged in her charge that FUSE harbored animus towards her 
because of the past use of maternity leave and/or her part-time employment, the ALJ 
found no evidence of animus in the record, nor do we. Sobie also attempted to 
demonstrate that FUSE'S refusal to appeal the grievance denial was arbitrary. Such a 
3See CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), 
affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
"District Council 37, AFSCME, 28 PERB 1J3062 (1999). 
5See Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 580, AFL-CIO and Central New York Reg. 
Transport Authority, 32 PERB 1J3053 (1999). 
6
 Nanuet Union Free Sch. Dist. And Nanuet Teachers Ass'n., 17 PERB p 0 0 5 (1984). 
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conclusion could only be reached upon a reading of the contract language as proposed 
by Sobie. There is no evidence that Sobie's interpretation of the contract is the only 
possible one,7 and there is no evidence of conduct that is either arbitrary, discriminatory 
or in bad faith. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Sobie's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
theALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 4, 2002 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Jbhh T. Mitchell, Member 
7Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, State University 
College at Buffalo, Local 640, 27 PERB 1J3004 (1994). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matters of 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC. 
CASE NOS. DR-072 
DR-101 
Upon-a-Petition-for Declaratory Ruling 
In the Matter of 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
CASE NO. DR-100 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), for 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (M. DAVID ZURNDORFER of counsel), for the City 
of New York 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of New York (City) and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the 
City of New York, Inc. (PBA) except to a declaratory ruling issued by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) in the above-referenced matters, dismissing DR-072 and DR-101,1 
and finding that certain proposals before him in DR-100 were properly submitted to 
arbitration. Both parties have filed cross-exceptions and responses to the other party's 
exceptions. In addition, this Board heard oral argument in these cases and accepted 
supplemental briefs on the issue of mootness. 
1
 No exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's dismissal of these two cases; we, 
therefore, do not consider them in this decision. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding the 
demand related to the Variable Supplement Fund (VSF) Fixed Schedule to be 
nonmandatory and finding the following four demands to be prohibited subjects of 
negotiations: Disciplinary Records and Disciplinary Procedure, Pilot Program-Oath, Bill 
i 
of Rights, and Modifications in Patrol Guide. The City excepts to the ALJ's decision, 
arguing that the conversion theory of negotiations articulated in City ofCohoes 
(hereafter, Cohoesf is not applicable to these parties and that, therefore, the following 
at-issue provisions of the expired collective bargaining agreement between the City and 
the PBA are nonmandatory: Hours and Overtime, Vacations, Fixed Post Duty, Meal 
Scheduling, and Funding Application; the PBA's proposal related to adopting the 
Sergeant's Chart is vague and ambiguous and is nonmandatory; and that the PBA 
demand related to Sick Leave - Home Confinement of Police Officers is nonmandatory. 
At oral argument, the City, for the first time, raised the issue of mootness, 
arguing that because the decision of the arbitration panel was issued on September 9, 
2002, and the parties had agreed to withdraw from the panel's consideration all of the 
demands in dispute before the ALJ, the arbitration award fully and finally resolved the 
case and there was no live controversy before this Board for decision. The PBA 
opposed the City's argument. The parties were invited to file supplemental briefs on the 
2
 31 PERB H3020 (1998), confirmed 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup. Ct. Albany CountyJ, aff'd, 
276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dep't 2000), leave denied, 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB 
H7018(2001). 
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issue; both have done so.3 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The specific language of the at-issue demands and contract provisions are fully 
set-forth inJheALJ!sdecision._WeadopttheLALXsJactuaLfindings.JThej_acts_are 
repeated here only as necessary for this decision. 
Chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998 amended the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) to extend to the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
impasse resolution jurisdiction over bargaining disputes between local governments 
and their police and fire unions that had formerly been within the jurisdiction of local 
boards. Those local boards, commonly referred to as "mini-PERBs," were created 
pursuant to Civil Service Law, §212. The New York City Board of Collective Bargaining 
(BCB) is one such mini-PERB. 
The parties' 1995-2000 collective bargaining agreement expired on July 31, 
2000. On November 3, 2000, the City filed a scope of bargaining petition with BCB. The 
3
 Counsel for PBA, who was also a member of the arbitration panel, submitted an 
affidavit with the PBA's post-argument brief, setting forth his understanding of certain 
agreements reached at arbitration with respect to PERB's jurisdiction and the 
withdrawal of the at-issue demands and contract clauses from consideration by the 
panel. We will not accept the affidavit and have not considered any of the statements 
contained therein in reaching our decision herein. This Board will consider only the 
evidence accepted and made a part of the record before the ALJ, unless one of the 
exceptions before us is an alleged erroneous refusal by the ALJ to accept proffered 
material into evidence or unless some other extraordinary circumstance, such as newiy 
discovered evidence, exists. Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sen. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3018 
(2000). 
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PBA responded that it was PERB and not the BCB that had jurisdiction over scope of 
bargaining issues. 
On December 15, 2000, the PBA filed a declaration of impasse with PERB, 
seeking the appointment of a mediator. The PBA also filed a petition for a declaratory 
ruling (DR-072), seeking a finding that all the provisions in the expired contract were 
mandatory subjects of negotiation and that all of the PBA's demands were mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. 
Also, on December 15, 2000, both parties filed declaratory judgment actions in 
State Supreme Court; the PBA seeking judgment declaring that, pursuant to Chapter 
641 of the Laws of 1998, PERB had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an 
impasse exists between the PBA and the City and to resolve scope of bargaining 
disputes between them. The City sought a determination that Chapter 641 violated 
home rule requirements of the State Constitution4 and that, even if Chapter 641 were 
constitutional, BCB had exclusive jurisdiction over collective bargaining impasses and 
scope of bargaining disputes between the parties, whether the scope of bargaining 
dispute arose before or after impasse. The actions were consolidated in Supreme 
Court, Albany County, which granted summary judgment to the PBA.5 The Appellate 
Division affirmed.6 
4
 NY Const., Art. IX, §2. 
5
 188 Misc2d 146, 34 PERB ff7017 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2001). 
6
 285 AD2d 52, 34 PERB fi7026 (3d Dep't 2001). 
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On December 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals modified7 the decision of the 
Appellate Division, stating that: 
We conclude that under the present statutory scheme, once 
a police or fire union pursues impasse resolution assistance 
from PERB and PERB declares an impasse, it has 
jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues between PBA 
and the City, to the extent necessary for PERB to exercise 
its exclusive jurisdiction to resolve impasses. Until such time, 
BCB retains jurisdiction to determine scope of bargaining 
outside of the impasse context. We decline to adopt the 
Appellate Division's proposition that "PERB has exclusive 
jurisdiction over scope of bargaining disputes between PBA 
and the City." [citation omitted] 
The Court further stated (at 7068) that: 
Thus, because we find that chapter 641 authorizes PERB to 
determine scope of bargaining in the context of impasse 
proceedings (without divesting BCB of its jurisdiction until 
PERB has declared an impasse), we conclude that the 
Legislature has accorded both agencies jurisdiction over 
scope of bargaining in negotiations between the PBA and 
the City. To the extent that this construction may result in 
venue shopping and concomitant delays, such 
consequences can only be rectified by the Legislature. 
...PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues 
necessary to impasse determination when a New York City 
police or fire union opts to utilize PERB's impasse resolution 
procedures, and [Chapter 641] does not otherwise divest the 
Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York of 
scope of bargaining jurisdiction.... 
7Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York, 97 
NY2d 378, at 389, 34 PERB H7040, at 7067 (2001). 
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A mediator was appointed in response to the PBA's declaration of impasse with 
PERB. We confirmed the mediator's appointment by decision dated October 11, 2001.8 
On November 2, 2001, the PBA's petition for interest arbitration was received by 
PERB. The City filed a declaratory ruling petition (DR-100) on November 20, 2001, 
arguing that Cohoes was not applicable and that a number of the PBA's demands and 
a number of provisions in the collective bargaining agreement were nonmandatory and 
were, therefore, precluded from submission to arbitration. 
On December 6, 2001, the PBA filed a second declaratory ruling petition (DR-
101), seeking a ruling that certain of the City's proposals were not properly included in 
its submission to the interest arbitration panel because they had been formally 
withdrawn by the City during negotiations. 
The parties participated in hearings before the interest arbitration panel on the 
PBA's petition for interest arbitration and in hearings before the ALJ on the declaratory 
ruling petitions. The ALJ issued his decision on April 30, 2002.9 The ALJ found that five 
demands or clauses addressed prohibited subjects of negotiations and five demands or 
clauses addressed mandatory subjects of negotiations. 
On May 7, 2002, during the final hearing day before the arbitration panel, the 
parties agreed to the following suggestion of the panel: 
.. .the withdrawal from our jurisdiction of the other matters which we 
are urging you to do, such withdrawal of those matters from our 
jurisdiction will unencumber us and allow us to reach a decision. 
8
 City of New York, 34 PERB 1J3033 (2001). 
9
 Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York, Inc. and City of New York, 35 
PERB H6603 (2002). 
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Of the other matters of Exhibit 10 [the ALJ's decision here] is without 
prejudice to your respective rights to pursue to finality those 
remaining issues in Board Exhibit 10. 
However, we urge that this be done with the understanding that the 
final judgment, whatever it may be, by whomever it may be, in case 
numbers DR-072, DR-100 and DR-101 -wi l l have no force, effect or 
impact on the finality of this Panel's award.... 
The arbitration award was transmitted to the parties for release on September 11, 
2002, by a September 9, 2002 letter, from the Chair of the panel, Dana E. Eischen, 
Esq., which also advised the parties: "I will retain jurisdiction for sixty (60) days, i.e., 
until November 11, 2002, to permit you to file any response and for the Parties to 
advise me whether they deem necessary a longer, more fully developed Opinion of the 
Chair." 
DISCUSSION 
We first address the issue of mootness raised by the City at oral argument. The 
City argues that the case is now moot because the bargaining demands have been 
withdrawn from the interest arbitration panel's jurisdiction, the arbitration panel has 
issued its award and the rights of the parties will no longer be directly affected by a 
decision on this appeal. The PBA argues that the case continues to present a live 
controversy where the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination 
and where the decision has immediate consequences; that the facts of the case 
establish an exception justifying a decision despite the alleged mootness; and that the 
parties' agreement to continue these matters to finality constitutes a special 
circumstance warranting our exercise of jurisdiction over this appeal. 
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We apply traditional concepts of mootness in our improper practice proceedings and 
here adopt them in deciding declaratory ruling petitions as well.10 Unless all three elements 
of the exception to the mootness doctrine apply, a court will not entertain questions of law 
made merely academic by a settlement agreement. The three elements are, as set forth in 
Hearst Corporation v. Clyne:n 
(1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or 
among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon 
typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or 
important questions not previously passed on, i.e., 
substantial and novel issues. 
The City argues that this appeal does not fall within the exception articulated in Hearst, 
supra. We do not agree. 
This appeal seeks a determination as to the mandatory nature often proposals 
or clauses. They deal with significant non-monetary terms and conditions. There is a 
likelihood that these issues will be presented in subsequent negotiations between these 
parties.12 
The City and the PBA are no strangers to interest arbitration, even though this is 
the first time that they have appeared before PERB. It is not unlikely that subsequent 
negotiations will end in compulsory interest arbitration, nor is it unlikely that the time 
frame for such an arbitration would be similar to the timeframe that was present in this 
10
 City of Peekskill, 26 PERB fl3062 (1993). 
11
 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 (1980). 
12
 The arbitration award covers the period of August 1, 2000 through July 30, 2002. It is, 
by its terms, already retroactive and the parties are faced with negotiating a successor 
agreement at this time. 
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arbitration proceeding. A review of the negotiability of these demands in each 
subsequent round of negotiations could be evaded simply by the normal passage of 
time in the processing of a declaration of impasse and a petition for interest arbitration. 
Additionally, the issues in this case are substantial and novel as to these parties. 
After years of legislation and litigation,13 the parties are now before this Board for a 
determination on the negotiability of several demands and contract clauses. As noted 
above, there are important legal issues to be here decided that have not been decided 
before and which have an impact not only on these parties, but other parties who now 
come under PERB's jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter 641. 
We also note that the parties agreed that these matters would proceed for final 
determination by PERB. We do not need to interpret the specific intent of the parties in 
agreeing to the arbitration panel's suggestion that the matters before us now be 
withdrawn from the panel's consideration.14 We find that language of the panel's 
proposal is sufficient for us to invoke the rationale we articulated in Solvay Teachers 
Association:^5 
In circumstances in which the parties specifically agree to 
the preservation of a scope of negotiation question and, 
thereby, rely upon our assessment of negotiability to 
determine a term of their agreement, there are presented 
the "special circumstances" we spoke of in [Buffalo Police 
13
 See Chapter 13 of the Laws of 1996; City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Ass'n of the City of New York, Inc., 89 NY2d 380, 29 PERB 1(7015 (1996). 
14See Seneca Falls Teachers Ass'n, 23 PERB 1J3032 (1990). 
1528 PERB H3024, at 3057 (1995). 
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Benevolent Association, Inc., 23 PERB1J3036 (1990)] which 
warrant our exercise of jurisdiction. Whether the case is 
never mooted in that circumstance or there has been a 
waiver of a mootness defense is largely immaterial. 
Application of a mootness concept under the circumstances 
presented here would not be "consistent with the policies of 
the Act" for only by reaching the negotiability question do we 
resolve the parties' collective bargaining impasse. 
WeTalso notelhat, bythe very language of The transmittal letter of the arbitration 
panel chair, the arbitration award is not "final" until November 11, 2002. The arbitration 
is still "technically" open for the parties to file a response to the panel's September 11, 
2002 award and seek a longer and more fully developed opinion of the chair. 
The applicability of our decision in Cohoes to these parties is a central issue in 
this case. 
The Court of Appeals in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New 
York, Inc. v. City of New York16 recognized that: 
[t]he duty to bargain exists only as to mandatory subjects, 
which are defined by law, and in the absence of an 
agreement, only mandatory subjects can be submitted to an 
impasse panel. It is true that an express statement of BCB's 
jurisdiction to determine scope of bargaining issues is 
provided in New York City Collective Bargaining Law, which 
states that "the board of collective bargaining . . . shall have 
the power and duty . . . to make a final determination as to 
whether a matter is within the scope of collective bargaining" 
(12-309a[2j). This provision dates back to the original 
enactment of the law in 1967 (NYCCBL §1173-5.0a[2], now 
recodified as §12-309a[2]) and was in effect when chapter 
641 was enacted. Despite that language, section 2 of 
chapter 641, codified as the new subdivision 3 of the Civil 
Service Law §212, provides in relevant part that 
notwithstanding other provisions of law to the contrary; the 
resolution of disputes in the course of collective bargaining 
97 NY2d 378, 390, 34 PERB fl7040, at 7067 (2001). 
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negotiations as provided by Civil Service Law §209 shall 
apply to any organized fire or police department. Subdivision 
4 of Civil Service Law §209 further provides that PERB shall 
render assistance when it "determines that an impasse 
exists in collective negotiations between [an] employee 
organization and a public employer... as to the conditions 
of employment." Thus, in order to determine whether an 
impasse exists as to "conditions of employment," PERB 
must be authorized to determine what qualifies as a proper 
condition of employment because if The impasse does not 
relate to a condition of employment, PERB has no authority 
to render assistance. The lower courts concluded that the 
term "conditions of employment," loosely defined to include 
"salaries, wages, [and] hours" (Civil Service Law §201 [4]), is 
the equivalent of the phrase "scope of bargaining" as it is 
used in the administrative code, and that chapter 641 
therefore grants to PERB exclusive scope of bargaining 
jurisdiction. 
The Court recognized that its decision might result in conflicting rulings by BCB 
and PERB on negotiability issues but left the resolution of such conflicts to the 
Legislature. We conclude that we must determine the negotiability of the issues before 
us within the context of the Act and our decisions on negotiability. We must, therefore, 
apply our definition of terms and conditions of employment, utilizing the case law that 
we have developed to make those determinations. That includes the application of the 
Cohoes conversion theory to the issues in this case. 
As the agency vested with the jurisdiction to decide scope of bargaining issues 
that arise between these parties in the context of our impasse procedures, we find that 
the ALJ's application of the Cohoes conversion doctrine in this matter was correct. 
The City argues that our decision in Cohoes was our attempt to address the 
perceived inequities that had arisen in negotiations as a result of the adoption of §209-
a.1(e) of the Act, better known as the Triborough Amendment (hereafter, Triborough). 
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The City further posits that since all agree that Triborough is not applicable to the City, 
neither should Cohoes, the remedy to the Triborough Amendment, be made applicable 
l 
to the City. However, the PBA does not agree with the City's analysis, and the ALJ 
never reached the issue. Neither are we in agreement that Triborough is inapplicable to 
the City. 
While §212 of the Act provides that certain provisions of the Act shall be 
inapplicable to any local government that has enacted a mini-PERB, it expressly 
excepts §209-a from the provisions of the Act that are made inapplicable to mini-
PERBs. Section 212 further requires that all such mini-PERBs have provisions and 
procedures that are substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures that are 
set forth in the Act and are made applicable to the State. 
That the City has not, at this time, accepted that all provisions of §209-a are 
applicable to it, including §209-a.1(e), does not require us to reach an identical 
conclusion. The Act states that the provisions of §209-a apply to all governments or 
governmental entities covered by the Act, including the City of New York. 
We have not had occasion before to review the City's determinations concerning 
the applicability of §209-a.1 (e) of the Act and our decisions in the cases arising 
thereunder. A review of BCB's provisions and procedures comes to us only on a 
petition by an aggrieved party to an improper practice proceeding.17 Furthermore, unlike 
other mini-PERBs, we cannot, pursuant to the provisions of §212.2 of the Act, require 
BCB to submit its procedures and provisions adopted by local law to us for periodic 
17Act, 205.5(d). 
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review to ensure that they are substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures 
set forth in the Act.18'19 As we now have the opportunity to review BCB's procedures 
and provisions, we here decide that §209-a.1 (e) of the Act is applicable to the City as 
part of §209-a, in the context of BCB's resolution of both scope of bargaining disputes 
and improper practice charges. Section 209-a.1(e) is not a vehicle for determining 
scope of bargaining disputes, it is a separate and distinct improper practice under the 
Act. That scope of bargaining determinations may be made in the context of deciding 
whether there is a violation of §209-a. 1 (e) of the Act does not make that section solely 
a scope of bargaining provision which BCB is otherwise excused from adopting in order 
to satisfy the "substantially equivalent" requirement of §212.2. 
We now turn to a determination of the negotiability of the at-issue demands and 
contract provisions. 
The PBA proposed the continuation in the collective bargaining agreement of 
certain provisions related to discipline and disciplinary procedures. They are 
Disciplinary Records and Disciplinary Procedures, article XVI, sections 8 and 9; Pilot 
Program - OATH, Appendix; Bill of Rights, article XIX; and Modification of Patrol Guide, 
Appendix. The ALJ, relied upon the decision of the Appellate Division, First 
18Compare CSL §212.1. 
19 
We have declined to exercise jurisdiction over scope of bargaining appeals brought 
to us from determinations of BCB, but none have involved issues arising from 
Triborough. See Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n of Greater New York, 22 PERB 1J3025 
(1989); aff'd 163 AD2d 251, 24 PERB 1J7523 (1s t Dep't 1990). 
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Department, in City of New York v. McDonald,20 which determined that §434 of the New 
York City Charter vested the City's Police Commissioner with the exclusive right and 
responsibility to discipline police officers. As we held in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York2^ prohibited subjects of bargaining "are those 
forbidden, by statute or otherwise, from being embodied in a collective bargaining 
agreement." While disciplinary procedures and aspects of discipline are not always 
prohibited subjects of bargaining, where there is a special or local law relating to police 
discipline, demands or contract provisions relating to police discipline or disciplinary 
procedures will be held to be prohibited subjects of bargaining.22 
The ALJ correctly found that the New York City Code and Charter are special 
laws that leave the discipline of police officers to the discretion of the Police 
Commissioner. The ALJ's analysis of the PBA's demands related to Disciplinary 
Records and Disciplinary Procedures, Pilot Program - OATH; Bill of Rights, and 
Modification of Patrol Guide properly found that each of the provisions deals with the 
discipline of police officers and impinges upon the Commissioner's discretion in this 
area. The demands are, thus, prohibited subjects of negotiation. That, in cases in which 
there was no local or special law related to discipline of police officers, demands related 
^ 201 AD2d 258, 27 PERB 117503 (1st Dep't 1994). 
21
 32 PERB H3051, at 3139 (2000). 
22
 Rockland City PBA, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 149 AD2d 516, 22 PERB 1J7516 (2d 
Dep't 1989); Town of Greenburgh v. Police Ass'n of the Town of Greenburgh, Inc., 94 
AD2d 771, 16 PERB fl7510 (2d Dep't 1983). 
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to disciplinary procedure,23 bills of rights,24 procedures for witnesses to incidents,25 or 
alternatives to discipline procedures,26 have been found to be mandatory, does not, as 
the PBA argues, compel a contrary conclusion. Here, there is just such a special law 
that removes these provisions from a traditional analysis of their negotiability. 
The PBA's reliance on City of Watertown v. State of New York Public 
Employment Relations Board 27 is misplaced. The Court of Appeals in that case 
stressed the strong and sweeping public policy of this State in favor of collective 
bargaining, which may be overcome only where there is "'clear evidence' that the 
Legislature intended otherwise".28 Finding that the statute29 in question did not preclude 
bargaining about procedures, the Court noted that, "the presumption is that all terms 
and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining."30 Here, however, 
the applicable local law clearly places discipline of police officers in the hands of the 
23 
24 
CityofUtica, 31 PERB 1J3045 (1998). 
City of Schenectady, 22 PERB 1T3018 (1989). 
25
 Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J3041 (1997); Cortland Paid 
Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 2737, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB 1J3037 (1996). 
26
 Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, AFSCME v. Helsby, 62 AD2d 12, 11 PERB 
1J7003 (3d Dep't 1978), aff'd on opinion below, 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB H7006 (1979). 
27
 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB 1J7007 (2000). 
28
 Id. at 7015 
29
 General Municipal Law, §207-c. 
30
 Supra, note 27. 
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Police Commissioner. Where police officer discipline procedures are contained in a 
local or special law, alternatives or modifications to those disciplinary procedures are 
prohibited subjects of negotiation.31 
The PBA also excepts to the ALJ's finding that the PBA's VSF Fixed Schedule 
demand for an increase in the schedule is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. The 
schedule, set forth in the City's Administrative Code, is fixed by State legislation through 
2007. As the ALJ correctly noted, even though the fund was initially created through 
collective bargaining, the in-issue demand seeks to require the City to change existing 
legislation and, as such, is nonmandatory.32 
The ALJ found that the PBA's demands relating to Hours and Overtime, Article 
III, §1(b); Vacations, Article XI, §3; Fixed Post Duty, Article XVI, §10; Meal Scheduling, 
Article XVI, §11; and Funding Applications, Article XVI, §16, were properly submitted to 
the arbitration panel because they are provisions in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement and, under Cohoes, they become, as to these parties, mandatory subjects 
of negotiation. The City excepts to the ALJ's rulings, arguing that each of the demands 
is nonmandatory and, because Cohoes is not applicable to the City, the demands need 
not be included in a successor agreement. 
31
 See, City of Mt. Vernon v. Cuevas, 34 PERB ^7038 (2001), citing to City of New York 
v. MacDonald, 201 AD2d 258, leave denied, 83 NY2d 759 (1994); Rockland County 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Town of Clarkstown, 149 AD2d 516, 22 PERB 1J7516 
M s t r i a n ' t 1QQAV Tnu/n nf CZroonhiirnh \i Pnliro 4 c c n nf Tnu/n r>f /^roonhiimh QA AQOH 
771, 16 PERB H7510 (2d Dep't 1983), leave denied, 60 NY2d 551 (1983). 
32
 See Rochester Fire Fighters, Local 1071, IAFF, 12 PERB fl3047 (1979). 
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Under the Cohoes conversion theory of negotiability, all of the legal terms 
contained in a collective bargaining agreement, no matter what their inherent nature, 
are "terms and conditions of employment" for purposes of the collective negotiations 
between the parties to that contract and may properly be submitted to interest 
arbitration. Having found Cohoes applies to this analysis, the at-issue demands were 
correctly found by the ALJ to be mandatory as between these parties. 
The City also excepts to the ALJ's finding that the PBA's proposal regarding the 
Sergeant's Chart is mandatory. The City argues that the demand is vague and 
ambiguous and interferes with the City's organizational discretion. The PBA argues, 
and the ALJ so found, that the PBA had sufficiently identified the chart it was proposing, 
both at negotiations and during the hearing on these petitions, and that the demand 
relates to the scheduling of shifts, a mandatory subject of negotiation.33 As described by 
the PBA, the demand is a work schedule, setting hours of work, and does not set 
manpower limits or limit the City's ability to determine manpower needs. As such, it is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation.34 
The ALJ determined that the PBA's Sick Leave demand is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. The demand seeks to make clear that an employee utilizing sick leave is 
confined to his or her home only during his or her regular shift. The City argues that the 
•" County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff, 27 PERB ^{3019 (1994); Starpoint 
Cent. Sch. Dist, 23 PERB 1J3012 (1990). 
Village of Mamaroneck, 22 PERB H3029 (1989). 
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demand would impinge upon its right to control sick leave abuse. In City of Rochester,35 
we found nonmandatory a proposal that would permit police officers on sick leave to 
leave their homes without any restriction whatsoever on their movements, explaining 
that "although the subject of sick leave is a mandatory subject of negotiation, a demand 
that the employer relinquish to unit employees alone all control over abuses in the 
taking of sick leave is not."36 City of Rochester is distinguished from the case at bar in 
that the demand there sought total employee control, which we were unwilling to 
countenance as eliminating all managerial control regarding sick leave abuse. That is 
not the case here. As such, the demand is mandatorily negotiable.37 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
We, therefore, find that the following demands are not properly submitted to the 
interest arbitration panel: 
1. Disciplinary records and disciplinary procedures, Article XVI, §§8 and 9; 
2. Pilot Program - Oath, Appendix; 
3. Bill of Rights, Article XIX; 
4. Modification of Patrol Guide, Appendix; 
5. Variable Supplement Fund. 
12 PERB ^3010 (1979). 
Id. at 3018. 
See County of Nassau, 18 PERB 1J3034 (1985). 
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We further find that the following demands are properly submitted to interest arbitration: 
1. Hours and Overtime, Article III, §1(b); 
2. Vacations, Article XI, §3; 
3. Fixed Post Duty, Article XVI, §10; 
4. Meal Scheduling, Article XVI, §11; 
5. Funding Application, Article XVI, §16; 
6. Sergeant's Chart; 
7. Sick leave. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 4, 2002 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
~\ STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 1180, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5225 
NEW YORK CONVENTION CENTER 
OPERATING CORPORATION, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communications Workers of America, Local 
1180, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5225 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and regular part-time Public Safety Supervisors and 
Command Center Supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Communications Workers of America, Local 1180. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 4, 2002 
Albany, New York 
MichaelTRjCuevas, Chairman 
